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ABSTRACT
Using annual, repeated cross-sections from national household survey data, we estimate how the January
1997 termination of federal disability insurance, Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Disability
Insurance (DI), for those with Drug Addiction and Alcoholism affected labor market outcomes among
individuals targeted by the legislation. We also examine whether the policy change affected health
insurance, health care utilization, and arrests.   We employ propensity score methods to address differences
in observed characteristics between substance users and others, and we used a difference-in-difference-in-difference
approach to mitigate potential omitted variables bias.  In the short-run (1997-1999), declines in SSI
receipt accompanied appreciable increases in labor force participation and current employment.   There
was little measurable effect of the policy change on insurance and utilization, but we have limited
power to detect effects on these outcomes.  In the long-run (1999-2002), the rate of SSI receipt returned



















  At the heart of the debate about the government’s role in providing economic support to 
individuals with substance disorders are opposing views about the relationship between 
substance use disorders (SUDs) and economic dependency. Some regard SUDs as any other 
disabling illness; by this view, afflicted persons may require government support in order to meet 
their basic needs (Rosenheck, Frisman, & Gallup, 1995; Rossi, 1989; Sosin & Grossman, 1991). 
An influential analysis documented striking similarities in the heritability and influence of 
environmental factors, the rate of adherence to recommended treatment, and relapse rates among 
those with drug dependence compared to patients with type II diabetes mellitus, hypertension, 
and asthma (McClellan et al. 2000).  Others focus on the behavioral aspect of SUDs, and imply 
that public programs may foster economic dependency and even encourage substance use by 
providing resources that can be used to purchase substances and by reducing incentives to work 
(Cohen, 1994; Phillips, Christenfeld, & Ryan, 1999; Shaner et al., 1995). Athough recent studies 
do not support this latter claim (Rosen, McMahon, Lin, & Rosenheck, 2006; Swartz, Hsieh, & 
Baumohi, 2003), the idea already has affected public policy. Most dramatically, in March 1996, 
the US Congress passed legislation barring persons with disabling substance disorders from 
receiving Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Disability Insurance (DI) benefits. Prior to 
this change, which took effect in January 1997, about 209,000 individuals with substance 
disorders had been receiving SSI, DI, or both (Gresenz, Watkins, & Podus, 1998).   
Whether terminating public assistance benefits to individuals with substance disorders 
encourages economic independence, and whether loss of these benefits causes harm, remains a 
key concern among policymakers. Surprisingly, this fundamental question has not been 
answered by research, despite recent, major policy shifts in federal disability programs targeting 
individuals with substance disorders, and despite the backdrop of growing emphasis on personal 
responsibility towards all potential public assistance recipients (Davies et al., 2000).  The goal of 
this paper is to estimate the effects of terminating federal disability benefits for individuals likely 
to have SUDs on labor market outcomes.  We also examine effects of the policy change on 
health and criminal justice outcomes.  
To estimate these effects, we pooled annual cross-sectional data from 1994-2002 in the   2
National Household Survey on Drug Abuse (NHSDA) and the National Survey on Drug Use and 
Health (NSDUH). We define two alternative treatment groups, or likely substance abusers, based 
on substance use, symptoms of substance abuse or dependence, or recent use of substance abuse 
treatment.  We use a modified difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) approach, 
comparing outcomes of substance abusers with a high probability of SSI use – to outcomes 
among non-substance-abusers with a high probability of SSI use, both before and after the policy 
change, netting out trends in outcomes during this time period that may have affected substance 
abusers and non-substance abusers with a low probability of SSI use.
1  To make non-substance 
abusers more comparable to likely substance abusers in our sample, we used propensity score-
based weighting to balance the distribution of observable characteristics across these two groups.  
Our approach and data source allow us to augment and improve existing evidence on this policy 
change in several ways. Unlike prior studies of this policy change, we considered both short-run 
(1997-1998) and longer run (1999-2002) effects of the policy, we incorporate a comparison 
group for the group targeted by the policy change, and we assess a range of health, labor market, 
and social outcomes in a nationally representative sample of individuals. 
  Using this DDD approach combined with propensity score-based weighting, overall, our 
results show that individuals with substance problems did increase their economic self-
sufficiency after the loss of public support benefits during the mid 1990’s.  This increase in self-
sufficiency took place without measurable impact on insurance coverage and health services 
utilization, although we have limited power to detect effects for these outcomes.  The gains were 
relatively short-lived among individuals reporting symptoms of substance abuse or dependence, 
among whom SSI receipt, employment, and labor force participation returned to levels closer to 
the pre-period rates after 1998. 
 In the short-run, 1997-98, the policy change accompanied higher participation in the 
labor force and current employment, and lower use of SSI among individuals likely to use SSI 
and likely to have substance abuse or dependence.  In contrast to prior studies reporting a drop in 
Medicaid use, we found no significant changes in rates of health insurance coverage from any 
source or health services utilization.  Welfare receipt changed little in the short-run.  In the long-
run, 1999-2002, rates of SSI receipt rebounded somewhat, but welfare use fell, and effects on 
                                                 
1 In our empirical estimation described in section 3, we use a triple interaction between the continuous probability of 
SSI use, presence in the substance abuser group, and an indicator for post-policy change, rather than a strict DDD 
estimate using a discrete variable for high probability of SSI use.   3
employment and labor force participation persisted among a broad group of likely substance 
abusers.  Not surprisingly, labor force participation among individuals reporting symptoms of 
substance abuse or dependence fell in the long-run after increasing in 1997-98.  We find no long 
run differential trend in health insurance status and utilization.  Finally, we find suggestive 
evidence that arrest rates rose within the targeted groups following the policy change, 
particularly during the longer term period (1999-2002). 
  Section II of the paper describes changes in public support programs affecting 
individuals with SUDs and the evidence to date on the consequences of the elimination of SSI/DI 
for drug abuse and alcoholism. Section III describes our empirical strategy. Section IV describes 
the data used, Section V presents the results of our analyses, and Section VI discusses 
conclusions and implications from our results. 
II.  Changes in public programs affecting individuals with SUDs 
A.  Elimination of Federal Disability Benefits for Substance Abusers 
  The federal SSI and DI programs are public income assistance programs for the disabled.   
Low income elderly, blind, and disabled persons can qualify for SSI payments, while DI 
provides federal disability insurance, and more generous cash payments to covered workers.  
Disabled workers must have a sufficient earnings history to qualify for DI benefits, which are 
more generous than SSI benefits.  However, low-income disabled workers with very limited DI 
benefits can supplement low benefits with SSI to reach SSI benefit levels.  Participation in the DI 
program for at least 24 months entitles beneficiaries to Medicare, and SSI recipients in most 
states automatically qualify for Medicaid (Gresenz et al., 1998). From the inception of the 
SSI/DI programs in the early 1970s, substance disorders were considered potentially disabling 
conditions. Initially, however, the number of beneficiaries in this impairment category was very 
small (Guydish, Ponath, Bostrom, Campbell, & Barron, 2003).  During the late 1980s and early 
1990s, the number of SSI recipients with substance disorders began to grow rapidly – between 
1989 and 1994, the number of SSI recipients in the substance disorder disability category 
increased from 16,100 to 101,685 (Barber, 1996). Figure 1 demonstrates the rapid growth and 
adjustment of the DA&A caseload in the SSI program over time.  In response to rapid growth in 
disability due to DA&A, the federal government in 1994 imposed a three year time limit on 
receipt of disability benefits for those with disabling substance conditions (Guydish et al., 2003).   4
In addition, SSA required DA&A beneficiaries to obtain substance abuse treatment, to be 
enforced by referral and monitoring agencies.   
  Despite these changes in 1994, the number of DA&A beneficiaries continued to rise 
during the 1990s, although as a group, they comprised less than 3 percent of the total SSI/DI 
adult population (Stapleton, Wittenburg, & Tucker, 1998). The federal government became 
increasingly concerned that recipients were not engaging in treatment and returning to work, as 
intended by the program (Gresenz et al., 1998). Moreover, despite the requirement that SSI/DI 
payments to addicted persons be managed by individuals called representative payees, there was 
concern that disability payments were being used to purchase drugs. There was at that time and 
continues to be mixed empirical support for this claim (Catalano & McConnell, 1999; Frisman & 
Rosenheck, 1997; Rosen et al., 2006; Shaner et al., 1995; Swartz et al., 2003). Nevertheless, 
these perceptions contributed to a major policy change.  
In March 1996, the US Congress passed P.L. 104-121, legislation terminating eligibility 
for SSI/DI programs on the basis of disabling drug addiction and/or alcoholism (DA&A); new 
and pending applications for cases in which a SUD was material to the disability determination 
would no longer be considered (Davies et al., 2000).  The legislation also mandated that existing 
DA&A recipients be terminated from the program as of January 1, 1997 (Davies et al., 2000).   
  Individuals with SUDs were given the opportunity to be re-assessed for SSI/DI eligibility 
based on any co-occurring mental or physical disability. If re-assessed successfully, these 
recipients regained their cash benefits through the SSI/DI programs along with any related public 
health insurance benefits, but without required treatment activity or a representative payee 
(Watkins & Podus, 2000). Of the 209,000 beneficiaries targeted by the January 1997 policy 
change, 80% were SSI beneficiaries and only 11% were DI beneficiaries who had never received 
SSI.
2 One year after the policy change, about 71,000 of the 209,000 targeted beneficiaries had re-
gained SSI/DI eligibility (Stapleton et al., 1998).   In other words, receipt of disability insurance 
among individuals disabled by SUDs fell by two thirds.  As individuals with little work history 
who do not qualify for the more generous DI benefits, and given that the vast majority of DA&A 
recipients received SSI payments, we expect that potential SSI recipients were those most 
vulnerable to any adverse consequences of the program change.  Thus, for this reason and due to 
                                                 
2 DI recipients whose benefits are below SSI levels can qualify for SSI to increase benefit levels.  Thus, about 
120,000 DA&A beneficiaries qualified for both programs simultaneously (Campbell, Baumhol, and Hunt 2003).   5
data limitations regarding DI receipt, we focus on SSI recipients in this analysis.  Figure 1 shows 
administrative estimates of the overall SSI caseload, those collecting benefits for DA&A, and for 
SSI recipients qualifying due to a mental health disorder (which would include the DA&A 
population) over the 1990s and after 2000.  The drop in SSI receipt from 1996 to 1997 is sudden, 
dramatic, and largely offset by later gains in the mental health caseload. 
B.  Evidence on the Effects of Losing Disability Benefits on Individual Outcomes 
  Individuals that received SSI/DI payments for DA&A are an extremely disadvantaged 
group. DA&A clients were mostly male (about 73 percent) and middle-aged (about 40 percent 
were between 40 and 49 years old) with high levels of psychiatric impairment, medical co-
morbidities, limited work experience, and low levels of education (Davies, Iams, & Rupp, 2000; 
McKay, McLellan, Durell, Ruetsch, & Alterman, 1998; Stapleton et al., 1998). Disability 
recipients targeted by the program changes had extensive criminal histories; a study of one large 
referral and monitoring agency suggests that about 84% of this population had been charged with 
a criminal offense, and nearly one third of males had a history of charges for a violent crime 
(Stapleton et al., 1998). As of 1995, about 53% of substance abusers receiving SSI benefits were 
classified as alcohol dependent, 18% were classified as drug dependent, and the remaining 29% 
had both alcohol and drug dependence (Barber, 1996). The average monthly SSI payment to 
disabled substance abusers was $425 in 1995, and 69% of substance abusers receiving SSI in 
1995 had no other source of income (Barber, 1996).   
  Given these characteristics, there has been concern that former DA&A recipients may 
have faced significant barriers in entering the labor market and finding jobs after the policy 
change took place.  Moreover, losing SSI/DI cash benefits, as well as losing the oversight of 
treatment and access to Medicare or Medicaid, may have adversely affected these individuals’ 
mental and physical wellbeing, utilization of health services, and criminal involvement. The few 
studies available on this topic, however, offer mixed support for this idea.  
  Watkins, Podus, Lombardi, & Burnam (2001), for example, follow 253 SSI 
beneficiaries in Los Angeles, interviewing them for the first time around the time the 1997 policy 
change went into effect and then again at 12 month, 18 month and 24 month follow-up 
interviews. Surprisingly, they find no evidence that the mental health status of respondents 
declined during this period, even though only 106 of the 253 respondents were still receiving SSI 
benefits at the 24 month follow-up interview.  There also was no increase in emergency   6
department visits and hospitalizations among respondents who lost SSI benefits (Watkins et al., 
2001).  The authors suggest that the lack of adverse consequences can be traced to other county-
based programs such as General Assistance which may have replaced SSI benefits. Despite this 
type of speculation that state and local assistance programs may have provided resources for 
substance abusers who lost federal disability benefits, there is little if any systematic research on 
this topic. 
  Guydish et al. (2003) report similar null findings in a multi-site study of 1,670 individuals 
who at baseline were receiving SSI benefits for a disabling substance use condition.  Most 
baseline interviews were conducted between November 1996 and March 1997.  Respondents 
were then interviewed and administered the Addiction Severity Index (ASI) every six months 
over a two year follow-up period.  Over time, they find either no change or improvement in ASI 
score, and no apparent association between ASI score and SSI receipt status.  In the same multi-
site study, and the only evidence of labor market outcomes to date, Campbell et al. (2003) 
assessed employment and earnings among 661 study subjects who were not collecting SSI, 
welfare, or general assistance in the 24 months following the policy change.  They found two-
fold to three-fold increases in employment rates six months after baseline, but earnings were 
very low.  After 24 months, less than 25 percent of respondents earned more than $500 per 
month (equivalent to the level of Substantial Gainful Activity, or the earnings level above which 
SSA considers individuals to be non-disabled) in six out of nine cities studied.  
Finally, a recent study based on data from Chicago indicates that termination of SSI 
benefits may have led to reduced access to Medicaid.  Hanrahan et al. (2004) used longitudinal 
data on 11,740 individuals who had been receiving SSI benefits for a substance disorder in 
Chicago in 1995, and showed that by 1998, almost half of these individuals had lost their 
Medicaid coverage (Hanrahan et al., 2004).  The limited geography of this study makes it 
difficult to infer results in other parts of the country. 
Because of the tremendous economic expansion of the late 1990s, our understanding of 
the effects of the policy change would be enhanced by comparing individuals targeted by the 
change to a control group of individuals unlikely to be affected by the termination of disability 
benefits.  Furthermore, while results such as those found in Chicago regarding Medicaid declines 
are provocative, further information from a more geographically diverse sample would augment 
the evidence available regarding the elimination of cash benefits to individuals with disabling   7
SUDs.  Finally, with the passage of time, it is now possible to assess longer term effects of 
terminating disability benefits for SUDs, something that wasn’t possible in prior studies.   
  The key question of interest to policymakers is the following: has the elimination of 
federal disability payments, as well as the health insurance and monitoring of treatment and 
finances that the disability programs previously provided, had long-term effects on economic 
self-sufficiency in the national population of individuals with disabling substance problems?  
Prior studies on this topic were based on data from geographically limited, narrowly defined 
populations and followed respondents for only about one to two years after the policy change 
took effect in 1997. Moreover, an important methodological limitation of prior studies is the lack 
of comparison groups; in these studies, outcomes are compared pre and post policy change in a 
group that was likely to be affected by the policy.  These policies can affect not just those 
receiving benefits at the time of the legislation, but potential new applicants, as well as those 
individuals diverted from the welfare caseload, who might otherwise have qualified for SSI 
benefits.  Even among those who maintained benefits because of co-occurring disorders, the new 
policy eliminated the requirement that individuals obtain treatment for their substance disorder, 
which might reduce the amount of treatment sought and obtained by those on SSI.   Studies of 
individuals exiting SSI cannot capture any of these effects. 
  The present study uses repeated, nationally representative cross-sectional samples of 
individuals from the 1994-2002 NHSDA/NSDUH to examine the long-term, national effects of 
this important policy change. A second advantage of our paper is the utilization of a comparison 
group as well as several other methods to help control for or mitigate other, potential omitted 
variables and trends that may be related to the outcomes of interest. 
 
III.  Data from National Household Surveys on Drug Use and Health 
We use pooled, annual, cross-sectional 1994–2002 data from the National Survey on 
Drug Use and Health (NSDUH), known as the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse 
(NHSDA) through 2001. The NHSDA/NSDUH is apt for this study because it is designed to 
produce substance use incidence and prevalence estimates for the general U.S. civilian, non-
institutionalized population aged 12 and older, including residents of non-institutional group 
quarters such as group homes, shelters, and rooming houses. The survey includes questions from 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) of Mental Disorders that allow diagnostic criteria   8
to be applied to identify symptoms of dependence or abuse of alcohol and various illegal and 
prescription drugs. Respondents are also asked about substance abuse treatment history, personal 
and family income sources and amounts, employment, health care access and coverage, and 
criminal record. The public use NHSDA/NSDUH does not include state identifiers, or any other 
potentially identifying information for respondents.  Overall interview response rates are 
consistently close to 80 percent. 
  There were few important survey methodology changes prior to 1999 (Gfroerer et al., 
2002).   The 1994–1998 surveys used a multistage area probability sample design involving five 
selection stages: primary sampling units (PSUs;  e.g. metropolitan areas, counties, groups of 
counties, and independent cities) selected to represent the total U.S. population, blocks or block 
groups, housing units or group quarters, age-group-smoking classes within sampled listing units, 
and eligible individuals within sampled age-group-smoking classes.  Blacks, Hispanics and 
cigarette smokers were over-sampled, the latter to increase the precision of drug use estimates.  
Information was collected using confidential, anonymous, face-to-face interviews conducted in 
the household and self-administered answer sheets for sensitive topics such as drug use (Gfroerer 
et al., 2002).  Annual samples for 1994 to 1998 averaged about 24,000 respondents.  
Beginning in 1999, the national, stratified, multistage, area probability sampling design 
was changed to a larger, state-based design, which involved selecting independent, stratified, 
multistage, area probability samples from 50 states and the District of Columbia (Gfroerer et al., 
2002).   In the eight most populous states, over-sampling was used to select about 3,600 to 4,630 
respondents from each of these states (CA, NY, TX, FL, PA, IL, MI and OH).  In the remaining 
states and the District of Columbia, the target number of respondents was about 900 to 1,030.  
About a third of the initial sample was allocated to the 12 to 17, 18 to 25, and 26 or older age 
groups respectively so that separate state-level estimates could be generated for each of these age 
groups (Gfroerer et al., 2002).    
The second change in the survey that took place in 1999 was a switch to computer-
assisted personal interviewing (CAPI) and audio computer-assisted self-interviewing.  
Computer-assisted interviewing yielded more internally consistent and complete data, and 
somewhat higher levels of reporting for some sensitive behaviors (Gfroerer et al., 2002).     
As described above, implementation of the DDD method requires that we identify 
individuals who show evidence of having a recent, disabling substance problem.  We consider   9
two alternate ways of defining such a group.  Our primary group of substance abusers – which 
we call the “broad” substance abuser group - includes individuals with at least one of the 
following: (1) heavy current use of alcohol and/or illicit drugs; or (2) 3 or more symptoms of an 
SUD for at least one single substance; or (3) receipt of any substance abuse treatment, including 
participation in a self-help group (e.g., Alcoholics Anonymous), in the past year. Heavy current 
use is defined as 3 or more alcohol binges (5+ drinks in one occasion) in the past 30 days; and/or 
6 or more occasions of marijuana use in the past 12 months; and/or 3 or more occasions of other 
illicit drug use in the past 12 months. The substance disorder symptoms included in the 
NHSDA/NSDUH surveys are based on DSM criteria and are applied to alcohol, illegal drugs 
(including marijuana, hallucinogens, inhalants, cocaine/crack and heroin) and non-prescribed use 
of prescription drugs (including pain killers, tranquilizers, stimulants and sedatives).
3 
  The advantage of using the broad substance abuser group is that it is inclusive enough to 
capture many different forms and stages of substance problems (e.g., alcohol abuse), but it is still 
stringent enough to be limited to individuals who are likely to have a recent disabling problem.  
Notably, this measure includes individuals with recent heavy use of substances, as well as those 
experiencing symptoms of disorder.  Estimates generated from 2002 NSDUH data set indicate 
that the correlation coefficient between this heavy substance use measure and substance 
dependence is about 0.38 for women and about 0.41 for men, and these correlations are 
significant at the .001 level. 
  A possible disadvantage of the broad group, however, is that it may include some 
respondents who use substances heavily, but are not experiencing disabling problems associated 
with use.  For this reason, we also consider an alternate, more stringently defined substance 
abuser group. Our “narrow” group is limited to individuals reporting either (1) 3 or more 
symptoms of substance disorder for at least one single substance; (2) receipt of any substance 
abuse treatment, including self-help groups, in the past year, or both (1) and (2).  The narrow 
group includes only respondents who appear to meet DSM criteria for substance dependence.  In 
our sample, as in reports on the pre-legislation DA&A recipients, the majority qualify due to 
abuse of alcohol, as opposed to illicit drugs.  When we categorize individuals into those suffering 
from at least 3 symptoms of an SUD or recipients of substance abuse treatment in the last year, 
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62% qualify due to alcohol only, versus 21% who qualify due to symptoms relating to an illicit 
drug only, and 18% relating to abuse or dependence of more than one substance.  We note that 
our rate of symptoms relating to alcohol-only is higher than the rate of DA&A recipients for 
alcohol only, but this could relate to the fact that individuals were more likely to report alcohol 
use and symptoms v. illicit drug abuse and symptoms in the NHSDA/NSDUH. 
  To maximize statistical power, our primary approach is to estimate models using a 
combined gender sample.  To reflect the disadvantaged nature of the SSI eligible population, we 
limit the entire analysis sample to respondents with fewer than 16 years of education.  We also 
confirmed that our results are robust to limiting the sample to respondents with 12 years of 
education or fewer, although limiting the sample in this way leads to a substantial loss of 
statistical precision.  Together, including all surveys from the 1994B NHSDA through the 2002 
NSDUH, 325,710 individuals were sampled, including 232,490 individuals aged 18-64.  Of these 
respondents, 156,041 had less than 16 years of education and available information on all 
dependent variables and covariates.  
We consider four types of outcomes: (1) receipt of public assistance; (2) labor market 
outcomes; (3) health insurance and health services utilization; and (4) arrests.  NHSDA/NSDUH 
respondents were asked whether they had received any SSI payments in the last calendar year.  
To ensure that respondents understood that they were being questioned about payments from SSI 
versus another public support program, the interviewer specified that “…federal SSI checks are 
either automatically deposited in the bank or mailed to arrive on the first of every month. If 
mailed, they are sent in a blue envelope."  Similarly, respondents were asked about welfare 
payments in the last calendar year, and respondents were instructed to exclude SSI.  From these 
questions, we create binary indicators of SSI receipt and welfare receipt. Note that the 
NHSDA/NSDUH question regarding receipt of federal disability benefits specifically mentions 
SSI, and does not include payments from the DI program. 
  We also create binary variables indicating whether the respondent is 1) employed now; 2) 
in the labor force; and 3) currently disabled.
4  To measure health insurance coverage, we create 
three variables that indicate whether the respondent is currently covered by: (1) any type of 
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work status.”  In 1999-2002, these variables are based on a question regarding work status “in the past week.”   11
health insurance; (2) Medicaid; and (3) any type of private insurance.
5  The interviewers 
specified that Medicaid is a public assistance program that pays for medical care, and also 
provided the name of the Medicaid program in the respondent’s state.  To measure utilization of 
health services, we create indicators of any visit to the emergency department in the past 12 
months, and any inpatient hospital stay in the past 12 months.  We also create two indicators 
specific to mental health services, given the likely high level of co-morbidity between mental 
and substance conditions in our sample.  These indicators include: any psychiatric outpatient 
services in the past 12 months, and any psychiatric inpatient services in the past 12 months.  The 
psychiatric inpatient question changed substantially after 1998, so we include only the first post-
period (1997-98) in these models.  Finally, our measure of involvement with the criminal justice 
system is a binary indicator of whether or not the respondent reports being arrested and booked 
for any crime in the past 12 months.  Arrest questions began in the 1995 survey; thus, we exclude 
1994 in arrest models. 
The public-use NSDUH/NHSDA does not include state identifiers, or time-invariant PSU 
identifiers that would allow identification of PSUs that remain in the sample over multiple years 
of the survey.  As a result, using the public-use data, we cannot account for the possibility that 
fixed state-level characteristics and/or co-occurring state-level trends (e.g., trends in welfare and 
Medicaid) may confound an observed association between the SSI policy change and outcomes. 
Using the public use data, we also cannot control for autocorrelation within geographic units.  
To address these limitations of the public-use data, we conducted a set of specification 
checks through a special, one-time arrangement with the Office of Applied Studies at SAMSHA.  
In these analyses, researchers at SAMSHA merged geographic identifiers into our analytic files 
and estimated alternative versions of short-run models (our model restricted to years 1994-1998) 
which included: state-level fixed effects; a set of time-varying state controls; and Huber/White 
standard errors adjusted for clustering on state. Appendix Table 1 describes our time-varying 
state covariates in detail.  These covariates included: (1) whether the state had a major ADFC 
waiver approved; (2) whether Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) was officially 
implemented in the state; (3) the state unemployment rate; (4) the percent of all persons under 
age 65 in the state not covered by public or private insurance; (5) the percent of persons under 
                                                 
5 The wording of the health insurance shifted slightly in the 1999 survey.  In 1994 to 1998, respondents were asked 
whether they were covered by health insurance in the “current month.”  In later surveys, respondents were asked 
whether they had “current” health insurance.   12
age 65 in the state covered by Medicaid; and (6) the state incarceration rate (number of prisoners 
sentenced to at least one year per 100,000 state residents).   
 
 
IV. Empirical  Approach 
A. Identification  Strategy 
  As in any non-experimental setting, the central challenge in estimating the effects of this 
policy change on individual-level outcomes is determining whether or not an observed 
association represents a causal relationship.  When analyzing the effects of the termination of 
disability benefits on economic and health care outcomes, results may arise from a causal 
relationship or from unmeasured factors affecting the outcome variable of interest at the same 
time as a major policy change.  In this case, the association between the policy change and the 
outcome would not necessarily be causal.  
In this paper, we combine several methods to attempt to circumvent this problem.  Our 
general strategy is to compare changes in mean outcomes before and after the policy change for 
individuals most likely to have been targeted by the change and for otherwise similar individuals 
who were unlikely to have been affected.  Our potentially targeted group consists of individuals 
who have both elevated probability of SSI use for a drug or alcohol-related disability based on 
their observed characteristics as well as recent heavy substance use and/or symptoms of 
substance dependence or receipt of substance abuse treatment.  We compare changes pre- and 
post- policy change, among individuals who are and are not likely to have SUDs, interacting 
these characteristics (time period and treatment group) with an individual’s predicted probability 
of SSI use.  We predict SSI use based on coefficients from a model based on 1994-1996 data, 
before the legislation terminating SSI eligibility for DA&A was passed.  This difference-in-
difference-in-difference (DDD) approach mitigates the problem of unobserved heterogeneity, or 
the possibility that substance abusers likely to use SSI have fixed, unmeasured characteristics 
that differ from other individuals likely to use SSI (e.g., greater likelihood of co-morbid mental 
disorders) and affect the outcomes of interest.   
Figure 2 demonstrates the intuition behind our strategy, although the details underlying 
the figure are explained in sections IV.B-IV.D.  The figure shows the rate of SSI receipt and 
employment separately for our broad treatment group (likely substance abusers) and control   13
group (non-substance abusers) among individuals with low and elevated predicted SSI receipt (in 
this figure, “elevated” indicates predicted SSI receipt ≥ .05, or twice the population rate of SSI 
receipt), weighted by to balance the treatment and control groups.  During the pre-period, within 
the elevated Pr(SSI) group, use of SSI is higher and employment is lower among the treatment 
groups.  By 1997-98, the pattern was largely reversed.  
We opt for this modified DDD approach to account for potentially confounding trends in 
outcomes between substance abusers and non-abusers that are not causally related to the policy 
change.   Thus, by differencing out changes in outcomes between substance abusers and non-
abusers, we address the possibility that an economy-wide trend that affected all substance 
abusers relative to non-abusers during this time period confounds the effects of the policy change 
(e.g. that substance abusers respond last to economic expansions).  Similarly, by controlling for 
predicted SSI use, we net out trends affecting likely SSI users during the period surrounding the 
policy change. The basic econometric specification, ignoring covariates for the moment, is as 
follows. 
 
In this equation, SAit = Substance Abuser (targeted group); Pr(SSI)iPre- = predicted probability of 
using SSI during 1994-96 period; “After1996t” = indicator for observations in 1997-2002; and 
“After1998t” = indicator for observations in 1999-2002. 
In this set up, Yit is an outcome variable for individual i in year t.  The key independent 
variables are the two triple interaction terms between substance abuser, the probability of SSI use 
based on pre-period program rules, and each of the two binary variables representing time 
periods after the federal government terminated DA&A benefits (“After 1996” and “After 
1998”).  These coefficients represent the changes in outcomes pre- and post- policy change for 
substance abusers versus non-abusers allowing the effect to vary by individuals’ probability of 
SSI use, based on pre-period relationships between observed characteristics and SSI receipt. 
  The “After 1996” and “After 1998” variables are determined only by time.  The variables 
[] () ( )
() ()






+ + + + + =
e i t it e t t it
e i t e i t
t it t it t
t e i it e i it it
SSI After SA SSI After SA
SSI After SSI After
After SA After SA After
After SSI SA SSI SA Y E
Pr 11 Pr 10
Pr 9 Pr 8
7 6 5
4 Pr 3 Pr 2 1
Pr * 1998 * * Pr * 1996 * *
Pr * 1998 * Pr * 1996 *
) 1 ( 1998 * 1996 * 1998




β β β β α  14
both take on a value of zero before the policy change (1993–1995 calendar years which 
correspond to the 1994-1996 survey years).  After the policy change, the “After 1996” variable 
takes on a value of one for the rest of the study period (1996-2001 calendar years which 
correspond to the 1997-2002 survey years).  Throughout the paper we will refer to survey years, 
rather than calendar years.  The “After 1998” variable takes on a value of one for the 1999 to 
2002 survey years.  We view the policy change as occurring in calendar year 1996, since it was 
in March of this year that the legislation was enacted and individuals could no longer apply for 
SSI benefits if they had a substance-related disability.  Note that this set-up allows the “After 
1998*SA” indicator and the interaction terms that include this indicator to capture the marginal 
effects of the policy change in the long-run (1999-2002), relative to effects during 1997-98. 
  In this model, the DDD coefficients  (β10 and β11) are unbiased estimates of the policy 
effects in the short-run and the long-run effects relative to short-run effects.  This interpretation 
will be correct as long as our identifying assumption, that no unmeasured event or policy change 
occurred at the same time as the SSI policy change that affected trends in outcomes over time 
differentially for substance abusers with a high probability of SSI use, holds.  For example, a 
crucial policy change occurring during our study period was welfare reform, which was 
implemented in the mid- to late 1990s depending on the state.  After passage of the 1996 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), welfare benefits 
were subject to 60-month lifetime limits with shorter limits (12-36 months) for continuous 
benefit receipt in many states, and welfare recipients were subject to work requirements in 
exchange for cash payments.  Welfare recipients who did not comply with requirements under 
PRWORA could have benefits sanctioned (either reduced or terminated).  As 90 percent of 
welfare recipients are female, this would affect females disproportionately.  Because our method 
differences out pre- and post- trends for individuals likely to use SSI benefits (presumably a 
group that also has an elevated rate of receiving welfare benefits), our approach may be 
contaminated by welfare reform only to the extent that its provisions differentially affected likely 
welfare users who were substance abusers.
6  As described in the prior section, through an 
                                                 
6 Some provisions of PRWORA could plausibly affect substance abusers more than others.  Convicted felons can be 
denied welfare benefits under PRWORA, and the legislation allowed drug testing of welfare recipients so that states 
could deny benefits to individuals testing positive for illicit drug use.  In practice no state has used suspicionless 
drug testing, but this could create an environment in which drug using women are less likely to apply for welfare 
benefits. Evidence on how PRWORA affects drug using women offers mixed results.  Women reporting symptoms 
of substance dependence were more likely to be on welfare in the mid- to late 1990s (Danziger et al. 2000; Meara   15
agreement with SAMSHA, as a specification check we estimated all of our short-run models 
with time-varying state characteristics that account for state-specific changes related to welfare 
reform, as well as changes in states’ insurance coverage, unemployment, and incarceration rates, 
in order to address this potential problem.   These models also included state-level fixed effects 
and Huber/White standard errors adjusted for clustering on state. 
 
B.  Generating the Predicted Probability of SSI Use Based on 1994-96 Policies 
To create the probability of SSI use, we first estimate logit models to predict the 
probability of SSI use during the period before the legislative change (survey years 1994 through 
1996) as a function of demographic characteristics.   
() ( ) β it it Χ f =   1 = SSI Pr   ′       ( 2 )    
In this set-up, Xit is a vector of characteristics for individual i, described below, and f(.) is the 
logistic function, or f(.) = e
x/(1+e
x).  Using the coefficients from these models, we predicted the 
probability of SSI use for the entire sample of individuals (years 1994-2002).  We then generate 
a continuous variable, Pr(SSI)iPre-, indicating the respondent’s predicted probability of SSI use 
during the pre-period.  This variable and its interactions with other variables are then included in 
Equation 1, as described above.
7   
C.   Using Propensity Score Models to Balance Treatment and Control Groups 
As described above, the main methodological challenge to this study is forming an appropriate 
treatment and control group to address the potential omitted variable bias that could affect our 
interpretation of estimates as the effect of terminating disability benefits for substance abusers.  
We use propensity score-based weights to balance observed characteristics between substance 
abusers and others in our control group.   
  Using survey years 1994-1996, we estimate a logit model that predicts whether an 
                                                                                                                                                             
and Frank 2007; Montoya et al. 2003), but also more likely to be sanctioned following welfare reform (Meara and 
Frank 2007; Morgenstern 2003).  Over a longer period, women with a history of illicit drug use were less likely to 
be on welfare (Pollack and Reuter 2006), but this disproportionate exit from welfare occurred after 2000, so it is 
likely to affect our long-run estimates only. 
7 In practice, 99% of pre-period respondents had a predicted probability of SSI use below .25, and the propensity 
distribution most closely resembles actual SSI use for these respondents.  Predicted SSI use was higher than actual 
SSI use among respondents in the top percentile of the Pr(SSI) distribution.  To reduce the noise introduced by this 
error in predicting Pr(SSI) at the top of the distribution, we ranked respondents on predicted SSI use, divided the 
sample into 25 bins averaging 6,250 respondents each, and replaced the predicted Pr(SSI) with the average actual 
SSI use within that bin during the pre-period (survey years 1994-1996).  Thus, our SSI propensities range from near 
zero to just under .25.   16
individual is a substance abuser as a function of observed characteristics.   
() ( ) β it it Χ f =   1 = SA Pr   ′       ( 3 )    
This model has the same covariates as in (2) and again, f(.) = e
x/(1+e
x).  We use the estimated 
coefficients from (3) to generate the predicted probability of being a substance abuser, p, and we 
weight each observation in our sample by the probability of being in the opposite group.  That is, 
individuals in the substance abuser group receive a weight of (1 – p), and individuals not in the 
substance abuser group receive a weight equal to p, a propensity score weighting approach 
described in Li, Zaslavsky, and Landrum (2007).  Like more commonly discussed inverse 
probability weighting techniques (Hirano & Imbens, 2001), this balances observed 
characteristics across treatment and control groups.  However, in this case, characteristics are 
balanced to resemble those among overlapping portions of the treatment and control distributions 
of observed characteristics. This adapted technique obtains average treatment effects, averaged 
over the distribution of covariates in the population where the treatment and control groups 
overlap as opposed to the entire population. This approach also minimizes the variance of our 
estimates, which can be excessively large in inverse probability weighting techniques when 
individuals have a very low propensity score.  By construction, this propensity score weighting 
technique, used previously in the clinical and health services literature, forces the distribution of 
observed characteristics in the propensity model to be identical across the two groups 
(McWilliams et al. 2003).  In the paper, all estimates presented weight each observation with the 
propensity-score-based weight multiplied by the sample weight provided in the 
NHSDA/NSDUH surveys, to make the data representative of the target population for the 
surveys.  This modified weight balances the distribution of observed characteristics during the 
pre-period among substance abusers versus the comparison group. 
  In equations (2) and (3), we control for the following individual characteristics (X): 
gender, race/ethnicity (Black non-Latino, Latino, and Other non-Latino race versus white non-
Latino), an indicator for whether the interview was conducted in Spanish,  age categories (22-23, 
24-25, 26-29, 30-34, 35-49, 50-65 versus 18-21), marital status (widowed, divorced, never 
married versus married), education (5 or fewer years, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, and 14-15, versus 12 
years), veteran status, number of household inhabitants (dummies for 2 through 6+ versus living 
alone), population density category (MSA > 1 million, MSA < 1 million versus not in an MSA), 
self-reported health status (poor, fair, good, very good versus excellent), ever used illicit drugs,   17
used alcohol before age 15, used marijuana before age 17, and whether the respondent ever 
smoked daily.
8  In the additional sensitivity analyses conducted by SAMSHA, we included state 
fixed effects in both models (Equations 2 and 3). 
D. Estimation 
Once we have obtained propensity-score based weights for each observation, we estimate 
models of our main labor market, health insurance, health care and arrest related outcomes.  To 
aid interpretation of our coefficients of interest, we estimate these as linear probability models as 
in equation 4.  
 
In  addition to the substance abuse indicator, the predicted probability of SSI use, the 
“After 1996” and “After 1998” indicators, and interactions between these variables, we also 
include as controls a set of measures, T, that vary across time t, and in some cases across group, 
k.  In the main analyses, these measures include the race/ethnicity-gender-specific national 
unemployment rate, the national rate of arrests per 100,000, and the national rate of incarceration 
per 100,000.   In the additional sensitivity analyses conducted through SAMSHA, these national 
time-varying variables are replaced by state fixed effects and state-level time varying measures 
of AFDC waiver approval, TANF implementation, state unemployment rates, state rates of 
insurance coverage, and state rates of incarceration.  By controlling for these secular changes 
(main analyses) and state fixed and time-varying characteristics (sensitivity analyses), we rule 
out the possibility that measured effects resulted from policy changes related to welfare and 
public insurance programs,  rising incarceration rates, or  employment cycles that were unrelated 
to the termination of disability benefits for substance abusers.   
  Because of the binary nature of our outcome variables, we also estimate logit models of 
the above equation, and present these results in the Appendix for comparison.  In the logit 
specification, one cannot interpret coefficients on the triple interaction terms as the DDD in the 
                                                 
8 We tested whether our results were sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of self-reported health status, given that 
it could plausibly be affected by the policy of interest, discontinuing disability benefits, but our results were 
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probability of a binary outcome, as discussed in detail by (Ai and Norton 2003).  Instead, we 
present results on the magnitude of effects based on predicted probabilities obtained from the 
logit coefficients in the models in three ways.  In each case, we compare results for a 10 
percentage point increase in pr(SSI)Pre- from .05 to .15, which allows us to make estimates within 
our range of data.  First we present the DDD of effects in the early post-period, 1997-1998 
versus 1994-1996 for substance abusers versus non- and for SSI propensities of .05 versus .15.  
Second we present the similar estimates of effects, but comparing the later post-period, 1999-
2002 versus 1994-1996.  Finally, we present the DDD estimate of effects in 1999-2002 versus 
1997-98.  For each of these, we bootstrap the standard errors of the DDD estimates with 100 
replications.   
In the OLS and logit models based on the public-use data, we adjusted for the stratified 
sampling design using Taylor Series Linearization methods and the information on Strata and 
Primary Sampling Units provided in the survey data.   As discussed previously, because of the 
way the PSUs were reported in public use data, this method does not allow for correlation over 
time within sampling units (many of which were constant across some survey years).  In the 
sensitivity analyses conducted through SAMSHA, we adjusted standard errors using 
Huber/White estimators, clustering at the level of state of residence.  
 
V. Results 
A. Sample Characteristics 
Table 1 presents the propensity score-weighted characteristics of the broad treatment 
group, (heavy substance users, treatment in the past 12 months, or those with 3 or more 
symptoms of substance abuse or dependence) compared to the control group by time period.  By 
construction, all of the observed demographic characteristics included in the propensity score 
model are perfectly balanced during the pre-period, so we show the outcome variables only (see 
Appendix Table 2 for the full set of covariates).  It is notable that measures of public program 
use and labor market outcomes are relatively similar between substance abusers and others 
during the pre-period.  SSI use is 4.1 percent among substance abusers compared with 3.2 
percent in the comparison group.  The percent employed is very similar among substance abusers 
(74.5 percent) and the comparison group (73.3 percent).  Reported rates of disability are also 
similar, 3.9 v. 4.5 percent.  Health care utilization is similar across groups with the exception of   19
psychiatric services, though substance abuse treatment would be an example of a psychiatric 
service, so the substance use in the treatment group could affect that.  Arrest rates are 
considerably higher among substance abusers, 6.1 percent versus the comparison group, 1.7 
percent.  This is not surprising given high arrest rates estimated among the DA&A population.  
Given our inability to control for pre-period trends in arrest rates, results on arrests should be 
interpreted with caution.  Otherwise, respondents in our broad treatment and comparison groups 
are highly likely to report exactly 12 years of education (45 percent) most are unmarried (51 
percent) and the plurality (36 percent) of respondents are aged 35-49 (Appendix Table 2).  
B. Public Program Use 
Table 2 shows the estimated effects of the SSI policy change on public program use.  As 
expected, SSI use drops disproportionately among individuals predicted to use SSI among both 
our treatment groups in 1997-98.  Among the broad treatment group, SSI use drops by 81 percent 
in the short-run, an estimate that is similar to administrative estimates suggesting that at least two 
thirds of former DA&A recipients had not re-qualified one year after the policy change took 
effect (Stapleton et al. 1998).  Among the narrow treatment group, the estimated drop is close to 
1, suggesting that for each percentage point increase in the probability of SSI use, individuals 
with symptoms of substance abuse are 1 percentage point less likely to use SSI after the policy 
change took effect.  The drop in SSI receipt attenuates in the long run, however.  Comparing SSI 
use in 1999-2002 relative to 1994-96, reductions in SSI use are no longer significant, and much 
smaller in magnitude compared with the 1997-98 effects.   The logit models presented in the 
appendix document similar trends in the use of SSI following the policy change, and in fact, the 
implied magnitude of these changes closely mirror the drop in SSI receipt reported based on 
administrative data from SSA (Stapleton et al. 1998).   
Table 2 confirms patterns documented elsewhere, that welfare use declined 
disproportionately among substance abusers, but only after 1998 (Pollack and Reuter 2006).  In 
models predicting welfare use, the DDD estimates for 1997-98 were not statistically significant, 
but by 1999-2002 compared with the pre-period, welfare use was 31 percent lower in the broad 
treatment group, and 39 percent lower in the narrow treatment group relative to the comparison 
group.   
C. Labor Market Effects 
Table 3 presents estimates of the labor market effects of terminating disability insurance   20
for substance abusers.  The SSI policy change is associated with a substantial short-term increase 
in employment for individuals regardless of the treatment group used.  For both the broad and 
narrow treatment groups, Table 3 suggests the policy change is associated with a one for one 
increase in employment as the probability of SSI use under pre-period rules rises.  Among the 
broad treatment group, the employment effects persist, although they are smaller in magnitude 
by 1999-2002.  The estimates suggest that employment was about 40 percent higher in the 
narrow treatment group in the long run compared to 1994-96.  Consistent with these patterns, 
both broad and narrow treatment groups showed a disproportionate rise in labor force 
participation.  The magnitude of these effects closely mirrors that of the employment effects, 
implying that the elevated employment represents individuals moving into the labor force rather 
than simply more successful job search during the booming economy of the late 1990s.  Another 
interesting and intuitive result in Table 3 is that the employment effects seem to be larger for 
full-time work compared with part-time work.  Logit models confirm that employment, in 
particular full-time employment, and labor force participation rose substantially and 
disproportionately among likely SSI users.  Estimates of these effects are significant at 
conventional levels based on the bootstrapped variance estimates associated with the logit 
models.   
The large magnitude and persistence of the employment effects among the broad 
treatment group are somewhat surprising given more moderate effects on SSI receipt in the long 
run.  As discussed before, the policy change affected both SSI and DI programs, and we are 
unable to directly observe DI receipt.  It is possible that the employment effects reflect changes 
in the population of substance abusers likely to use DI (which one would expect to be correlated 
with the propensity to use SSI).  This could potentially explain the large employment effects in 
the face of a more moderate effect on SSI.  An alternative explanation is that other time varying 
factors disproportionately affected the target group, high propensity SSI users who also report 
heavy substance use.  Although multiple factors could create the pattern of work and SSI receipt 
we observe, it seems likely that individuals were influenced by the termination of disability, 
since these policies signaled a change in attitude towards individuals with SUDs. 
D. Specification check: state-level factors 
Our main results, demonstrating less reliance on public programs in the short-run and 
increased employment in the face of the termination of SSI benefits, are based on specifications   21
that do not have controls for underlying trends in a respondent’s state.  Table 4 shows the results 
of a specification check using restricted data with state identifiers (analyzed by SAMHSA) from 
1994-98.  In these models, we control for fixed state effects and time varying state trends 
including welfare waivers, TANF implementation, incarceration rates, unemployment rates, rates 
of uninsurance, and state Medicaid participation rates.  The pattern in Table 4 mirrors what we 
found in our main analyses in Tables 2 and 3.  SSI use falls substantially, and both labor force 
participation and employment rise in the first two years following the policy change.  We take 
this as evidence that our results do not reflect state-specific trends that disproportionately affect 
likely users of SSI with SUDs.  
E. Health Insurance 
One aspect of welfare reform and reforms to SSI/DI that has received much attention is 
the potential loss of health insurance benefits as individuals exit public programs for work.  This 
could happen explicitly, as in the case of terminating SSI benefits and linked eligibility for 
Medicaid, or indirectly, as a result of exceeding income limits for Medicaid eligibility once 
employed, but with no alternative source of coverage through an employer or privately.  Indeed, 
in the late 1990s, there is evidence that low-income female caregivers who reduced rates of drug 
and alcohol use simultaneously reduced use of public programs, increased rates of employment, 
and were more likely than other low-income women to become uninsured (Meara and Greenfield 
2008).  The rate of health insurance, and the form of insurance among those covered did not 
change disproportionately for individuals who were heavy substance users or those with 
symptoms of dependence. Medicaid coverage did not fall significantly for this group, although 
the sign of the effect was negative and the magnitude was large.  In the longer run, Medicaid 
receipt differed little for likely substance abusers with a high propensity to use SSI compared 
with others, and there were no long-run changes in the share of individuals reporting any health 
insurance coverage.  Logit models on health insurance yield similar results, suggesting that 
among substance abusers likely to use SSI, health insurance status did not change significantly.   
F. Other Outcomes - Health care utilization and Arrests 
 Because we documented no disproportionate change in health insurance status or source 
of coverage, it is unclear whether one should expect large changes in health care utilization.  In 
Table 6, the likelihood of reporting an ER visit, a hospital or psychiatric admission all increased 
in 1997-2002, but these differences were not statistically significant in the linear probability   22
models.  The logit models (Appendix Table 5) suggest that hospitalizations increased among the 
broad treatment group.  On balance, given little power to detect differences in these relatively 
rare events, we have no evidence to suggest systematic change in utilization after termination of 
SSI benefits for substance abuse. 
The final two columns in Table 6 display results from models of arrests.  This analysis 
must be interpreted with caution because the assumption that arrests should move together in the 
treatment and control groups is strong given the difference in levels of arrest rates before the 
policy change between these groups.  Because we lack arrest data before 1995, we were unable 
to compare trends in arrests during the pre-period.  With this caveat in mind, however, the results 
suggest a disproportionate rise in arrests in both treatment groups in the longer term, with the 
effect being most immediate and largest among the narrow treatment group.  These arrest effects 
are statistically significant only in the logit-based long run estimates presented in Appendix 
Table 5.  We view these results as suggestive evidence that termination of SSI benefits for may 
increase criminal activity among individuals with symptoms of substance abuse or dependence. 
G. Compositional Changes in the Sample 
One threat to our empirical approach is the fact that we do not follow the same 
individuals over time.  Thus, if the termination of SSI benefits either increased or decreased 
substance abuse in the population, our results could be driven by compositional changes in the 
treatment and control groups rather than by changes in the outcomes of interest.  We tested for 
changes in the composition of our sample by estimating models where presence in a treatment 
group was the dependent variable.  The explanatory variables of interest were the same as in 
equation 3.  We also tested for changes in household composition (the likelihood that individuals 
live alone, for example) since household composition might be another channel through which 
the policy could change other outcomes.  In all cases, there were no significant changes in the 
composition of our sample compared with the baseline period of 1994-96 (Results available 
upon request).  This evidence offers further support for our research design despite the 
limitations posed by the lack of longitudinal data. 
 
VI. Conclusions  
In the mid-1990s, multiple reforms aimed to increase self-sufficiency among potential 
recipients of public income support.  In this spirit, the 1997 termination of federal disability   23
benefits for individuals with disabling substance disorders was no different in that it eliminated 
potential disincentives to work related to the availability of disability benefits. There has been 
concern, however, that these benefits are the only legal means by which addicted persons can 
obtain income to satisfy their basic needs and access health and treatment services.  Recent 
studies have failed to uncover changes in substance abusers’ outcomes in response to the policy 
shift, but these studies primarily analyze small, geographically constrained samples, and 
available evidence to date lacks a control group against which to compare outcomes for 
individuals affected by the termination of benefits.  Furthermore, former literature in this area 
offers limited evidence on variables measuring self-sufficiency such as labor market 
participation and employment, and no existing study attempted to assess effects of the policy 
change beyond 24 months.  In this paper, we examined trends in labor market outcomes, public 
program participation, health care access and utilization, and self-reported arrests among 
substance dependent individuals using a much larger national sample over a period that began 
three years before the policy change and extends until 2001 (survey year 2002), allowing for the 
estimation of both short-run and longer term effects.  
Our findings confirm earlier work showing few measurable negative consequences of the 
policy change, though with one possible, and potentially important exception.  The use of SSI 
fell disproportionately for the targeted groups, and there appears to have been no replacement of 
SSI benefits with welfare benefits, which is not surprising given coincident reforms to welfare.  
Labor force participation and employment rose substantially faster for our treatment groups 
compared with others.  The persistent rise in employment among heavy substance users was 
fueled by increases in full-time work.  Among individuals with three or more symptoms of 
substance abuse or dependence, the labor market effects differed.  Individuals with symptoms of 
abuse or dependence increased employment in 1996 and 1997, but they were less likely to hold 
onto employment gains. Health insurance status and source of coverage did not change 
measurably.  Consistent with this, the analyses of health care utilization yield few, if any, 
systematic effects related to the policy change, although the pattern of results suggest that 
psychiatric outpatient visits fell following the change while ER visits and hospital admissions 
rose.  Most disturbingly, arrests rose disproportionately among likely SSI users with symptoms 
of drug dependence. 
During the 1990s, the labor market reached unprecedented levels of employment,   24
especially among those with relatively few skills or labor market experience.  In such an era, we 
document that employment rose, and remained elevated among a group of individuals likely to 
use SSI and with moderate to heavy substance use.  Among our narrow treatment group, 
individuals with symptoms of dependence or in substance abuse treatment, there was a relatively 
short-lived employment response.  That is, employment increased in the months following the 
policy change, but by 1999-2002, employment fell for these individuals.  This mirrors the 
finding that most employment among former DA&A recipients failed to meet levels of 
Substantial Gainful Activity established for federal disability programs (Campbell et al. 2003).   
Our results suggest that disability programs have provided income support to individuals 
unable to maintain attachment to the labor force even during a period of strong economic 
conditions.  Fortunately, the expected disastrous consequences of lost of health insurance, and 
heavier utilization of inpatient or emergency medical services did not occur or were too small to 
observe.  Of course, we were unable to assess other important indicators of well-being, like 
income, changes in drug use, changes in the rate or severity of mental health disorders, or 
changes in eviction and/or homelessness, among this population.  Aside from productivity losses, 
the largest cost of substance abuse stems from crime.  We find that arrests increased following 
termination of disability for individuals with heavy substance use or symptoms of SUDs.   
Because many individuals with a history of substance use did increase self-sufficiency 
through increased employment and a reduction in the use of public programs, the results shown 
here suggest, on balance, that the individuals targeted by the termination of SSI/DI benefits for 
substance abuse, had relatively few disasters.  The short term responses, however, suggest an 
interesting set of new questions.  In particular, with these data we do not know how individuals 
entered the labor market, and what services, if any, aided them in their search for employment.  
Additional information on the nature of jobs held by individuals during this unique period, and 
the circumstances under which individuals left, are crucial for understanding the complete 
ramifications of policy changes aiming to increase self-sufficiency entirely through incentives.   
Questions regarding the employment histories of individuals with SUDs are increasing in 
importance as the recent reauthorization of TANF has further limited states’ ability to address the 
needs of welfare recipients with substance abuse issues.  States are no longer at liberty to exempt 
women from work requirements while they obtain treatment for substance use or mental health 
disorders.  Furthermore, the new regulations require more hours of work, and higher   25
participation requirements.  It is difficult to forecast the effects of these limitations, but they 
signal a new era under which vulnerable, low-skilled individuals with SUDs increasingly have 
fewer sources of support as they seek the very self-sufficiency that reforms of the mid-1990s 
aimed to achieve. 
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Table 1:  Weighted Outcomes by Treatment Group and Time Period 

































Labor market & program participation:          
 SSI  0.041  0.032  0.025  0.039  0.042  0.035 
 Welfare  0.050  0.051  0.045  0.034  0.030  0.028 
  Employed
   0.745 0.733 0.743 0.757  0.762  0.796 
 Full-time  0.596  0.596  0.617  0.633  0.588  0.643 
 Part-time  0.145  0.128  0.118  0.117  0.131  0.115 
  In Labor Force  0.816  0.785  0.813  0.806  0.815  0.830 
 Disabled  0.039  0.044  0.034  0.051  0.050  0.047 
Health Insurance:         
  Any health insurance  0.739  0.766  0.745  0.788  0.752  0.795 
  Private health insurance  0.641  0.655  0.652  0.693  0.638  0.691 
 Medicaid    0.075  0.083  0.070  0.071  0.087  0.076 
Health care utilization:          
 ER  visit  0.211  0.200  0.225  0.198  0.351  0.299 
  Inpatient stay   0.079  0.091  0.086  0.086  0.105  0.088 
  Inpatient psychiatric stay   0.010  0.005  0.013  0.005  --  -- 
 Psychiatric  outpatient  services  0.069  0.052  0.080  0.051  0.116  0.059 
Arrested:  past year  0.061 0.017 0.069 0.016  0.128 0.045 
A   Sample limited to respondents with <16 years of education weighted by both sampling and propensity-score based weights. 
B   Substance Abuser = 
respondents reporting moderate/heavy substance use, and/or 3+ symptoms of disorder, and/or substance treatment (including self-help groups) in last 
year. See text for details.
C   Information on mental health inpatient stays is not comparable during 1999-2002 period. 
D Employment is based on “present 
work status.” 
E  Health insurance refers to coverage at survey (or in survey month).       30
 
Table 2: Public Program Participation  
  SSI Welfare 



































































































NOTES:  Based on linear probability models that account for the complex 
survey sample design. Propensity score-based weights are used to match 
observed characteristics between treatment and control groups. Robust, 
Huber-White corrected SEs shown in ( ) correct for correlation within 
sampling units.  *=p-value<=.10, **<=.05, ***<=.01.  Models also include 
controls for race-gender specific national unemployment rate, national 
arrest rate per 100,000 and national incarceration rate per 100,000 
(coefficients not shown). Analyses are based on a sample size of 156,041. 
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Table 3:  Labor Market Outcomes 
Outcome:  Employed  Full-time  Part-time  Disabled  In labor force 







































































































































































































































NOTES:  Based on linear probability models that account for the complex survey design.  Propensity score-based weights are used to match the 
distribution of observed characteristics of treatment and control groups. Robust, Huber-White corrected SEs shown in ( ) correct for correlation within 
sampling units.  *=p-value<=.10, **<=.05, ***<=.01.  Models also include controls for race-gender specific national unemployment rate, national arrest 
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Table 4:  Specification Check: Short-Run Results from Models with State Fixed Effects and State Time Trends 
Broad Substance Abuser Group, Time Period 1997-1998 
 









































































































NOTES:  Based on linear probability models that account for the complex survey design. Propensity score-based weights are used to match the 
distribution of observed characteristics of treatment and control groups. Robust, Huber-White corrected SEs shown in ( ) correct for correlation 
within sampling units.  *=p-value<=.10, **<=.05, ***<=.01.  Models also include state fixed effects and the following time-varying state 
characteristics: (1) whether the state had a major ADFC waiver approved; (2) whether TANF was officially implemented in the state; (3) the state 
unemployment rate; (4) the percent of all persons under age 65 in the state not covered by public or private insurance; (5) the percent of persons 
under age 65 in the state covered by Medicaid; and (6) the state incarceration rate.  Analyses are based on a sample size of 52,363; only data from 
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Table 5:  Health Insurance Coverage 
  Medicaid  Private Insurance  Any HI 

























































































  .012 
(.028) 






















  .107 
(.306) 




























NOTES:  Based on linear probability models that account for the complex survey design. Propensity score-
based weights are used to match observed characteristics between treatment and control groups. Robust, 
Huber-White corrected SEs shown in ( ) correct for correlation within sampling units.  *=p-value<=.10, 
**<=.05, ***<=.01.  Models also include controls for race-gender specific national unemployment rate, 
national arrest rate per 100,000 and national incarceration rate per 100,000 (coefficients not shown). Analyses 
are based on a sample size of 156,041. 
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Table 6:  Health Care Utilization and Arrests in Last Year 
 
Outcome: ER  visit 
Hospital 





























































































































































































































NOTES:  Based on linear probability models that account for the complex survey design. Propensity score-based weights are used to match observed 
characteristics between treatment and control groups. Robust, Huber-White corrected SEs shown in ( ) correct for correlation within sampling units.  
*=p-value<=.10, **<=.05, ***<=.01.  Models also include controls for race-gender specific national unemployment rate, national arrest rate per 
100,000 and national incarceration rate per 100,000 (coefficients not shown). Analyses are based on a sample size of 156,041.  35
 
Sources for Figure 1: for Total and Mental Health Caseload: Social Security Administration, 
Social Security Bulletin, Annual Statistical Supplement, 1991-2004 (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1991-2004).  For DA&A population:  Barber, S.L. Supplemental Security 
Income for whom Alcoholism and Drug Addiction Provisions Apply (DA&A Recipients). 
(Washington: Office of Program Benefits Policy, 1996) and for 1996, 1997 DA&A figures 
:Schmidt, Lucie. 2004. Effects of Welfare Reform on the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 















































































Figure 2: Trends in SSI and Employment, by Year 
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Appendix 
Symptoms of Substance Abuse 
Starting in 1999, the survey includes the following six criteria, pertaining to the previous 
12 month period: 1) having a period of at least a month during which a great deal of time was 
spent getting the drug, using the drug, or getting over its effects; 2) building up a tolerance for 
the drug so that the same amount of the drug had less effect than before; 3) using the drug much 
more often or in larger amounts than intended; 4) use of the drug often preventing going to work 
or school, taking care of children, or engaging in recreational activities; 5) the drug causing 
emotional or psychological problems (such as feeling uninterested, depressed, suspicious or 
paranoid, or having strange ideas) or health problems (such as liver or stomach disease, 
pancreatitis, feet tingling, numbness, memory problems, an accidental overdose, a persistent 
cough, a seizure or fit, hepatitis, or abscesses); and 6) wanting or trying to stop or cut down use 
of the drug but being unable to do so.  The survey items used to capture symptoms of substance 
disorder changed somewhat.  We dealt with this issue by using the six symptoms listed above 
which are fairly consistent across all years. 
Appendix Table 1: Sources for state policies, insurance coverage, and incarceration rates. 
Variable   Definition of variable  Source 
Welfare 
waiver 
Ranges from 0 to 1.  
Share of year in which 
state had welfare 
waiver in effect. 
Crouse, Gil.  (1999). “State Implementation of Major 
Changes to Welfare Policies, 1992 – 1998.”  Office of 
Human Services Policy, Assistant Secretary for Planning 
and Evaluation, U.S. Department of Health and Human 




Share of population 
under age 65 with 
health insurance for 
part of the year. 
U.S. Census Bureau.  “Table HI-6.  Health Insurance 
Coverage Status and Type of Coverage by State-- People 
Under 65: 1987 to 2005.”  Compiled by US Census Bureau 
based on data from the Current Population Survey, 1988-
2006 Annual Social and Economic Supplements.  Accessed 




Prisoners sentenced to 
more than a year, per 
100,000 population  
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2004.  “Prisoners under State or 
Federal jurisdiction, Federal and State-by-State, 1977-
2004.” Crime & Justice Electronic Data Abstracts. 
 Accessed on 9/19/2008 at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/dtdata.htm#corrections 
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Information regarding welfare reform comes from the Office of Human Services Policy 
at the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS, 2007).  States that implemented a 
waiver or TANF on the first of the year, and states that did not implement a waiver of TANF 
policy at all in that year, were assigned a dummy variable (1 if yes, 0 if no) indicating the policy 
was in effect, or was not in effect during the entire year.  In cases where a state implemented a 
policy change mid-year, the state was assigned a value corresponding to the portion of the year 
in which the policy was in effect – for example, a state that implemented a waiver on July 1 was 
assigned a .5 for that year.
9   Insurance coverage rates come from the Housing and Household 
Economic Statistics Division of the US Census Bureau.  Incarceration rates come from the 
Bureau of Justice Statistics. 
                                                 
9 States that implemented policies prior to the 15
th of the month were treated as if the policy were not in effect 
during that month, while states that implemented policies on the 15
th or later were treated as if the policy were in 
effect during the entire month.   39
Appendix Table 2:  Weighted Summary Statistics 
   
Pre-Period: 1994-1996  1997-1998  1999-2002 






















          
Sex  Female  0.415 0.415 0.397  0.394  0.403 0.405 
Age  18-21  0.152 0.152 0.178  0.154  0.199 0.159 
  22-23  0.061 0.061 0.066  0.063  0.068 0.060 
  24-25  0.056 0.056 0.050  0.054  0.050 0.049 
  26-29  0.104 0.104 0.103  0.101  0.097 0.086 
  30-34  0.142 0.142 0.135  0.130  0.114 0.114 
  35-49  0.360 0.360 0.337  0.361  0.339 0.382 
  50-64  0.125 0.125 0.131  0.136  0.133 0.151 















  8  0.017 0.017 0.013  0.014  0.020 0.014 
  9  0.033 0.033 0.026  0.028  0.037 0.029 
  10  0.055 0.055 0.046  0.048  0.050 0.046 
  11  0.078 0.078 0.090  0.081  0.088 0.082 
  12  0.452 0.452 0.457  0.432  0.406 0.459 
  13  0.097 0.097 0.118  0.111  0.131 0.112 
  14-15  0.236 0.236 0.216  0.257  0.234 0.233 
Marital Status  Married  0.486 0.486 0.459  0.475  0.386 0.447 
  Widowed  0.015 0.015 0.016  0.019  0.018 0.019 
  Divorced  0.159 0.159 0.137  0.145  0.161 0.177 
  Never  Married  0.340 0.340 0.388  0.361  0.435 0.356 
Race/Ethnicity  White  0.723 0.723 0.728  0.709  0.694 0.693 
  Black  0.134 0.134 0.125  0.133  0.134 0.132 
  Latino  0.114 0.114 0.115  0.121  0.134 0.129 
  Other  0.029 0.029 0.032  0.037  0.038 0.044 
Language  Spanish  speaker  0.036 0.036 0.034  0.039  0.044 0.042 
Military Veteran    0.155 0.155 0.152  0.150  0.108 0.139 
Health  Poor  0.024 0.024 0.017  0.022  0.024 0.022   40
  Fair  0.081 0.081 0.082  0.085  0.100 0.083 
  Good  0.275 0.275 0.245  0.271  0.288 0.303 
  Very  Good  0.340 0.340 0.364  0.345  0.363 0.365 
  Excellent  0.278 0.278 0.292  0.276  0.225 0.226 
Prior substance use  Lifetime use of illicit drugs  0.604 0.604 0.668  0.628 0.781  0.687 
  Alcohol before age 15  0.254  0.254  0.253  0.248  0.342  0.279 
  Marijuana before age 17  0.271  0.271  0.308  0.290  0.406  0.319 
  Smoke  daily  0.641 0.641 0.673  0.637  0.587 0.633 
Household Size  1    0.086 0.086 0.102  0.092  0.115 0.087 
  2    0.291 0.291 0.292  0.295  0.257 0.287 
  3    0.223 0.223 0.228  0.210  0.229 0.224 
  4    0.219 0.219 0.192  0.215  0.215 0.220 
  5    0.111 0.111 0.093  0.105  0.102 0.110 
  6 or More   0.071  0.071  0.079  0.071  0.082  0.071 
Urbanicity
  In MSA >1 million  0.421  0.421  0.390 0.402 0.446  0.418 
  In MSA <1 million  0.344  0.344 0.367  0.377 0.339  0.355 
  Not  in  MSA  0.235 0.235 0.243  0.222  0.214 0.227 
NOTES:  
A   Sample limited to respondents with <16 years of education & percentages reflect both sampling and propensity-score based weights to balance treatment 
and control group in pre-period. 
B   Broad Treatment = respondents reporting moderate/heavy substance use, 3+ symptoms of disorder, and/or substance treatment 
(including self-help groups) in last year.  
“moderate to heavy use”= any of the following: a) an individual "binges" (5 or more alcoholic beverages are consumed at one 
sitting) >=3 times/month; b) an individual uses marijuana >=6 times/ year; or c) an individual uses any illicit drug other than marijuana >=3 times/year. The “3 or more 
symptoms” = person has >= 3 of 6 symptoms for at least one single substance, based on questions regarding 10 substances including alcohol.  
C   Information on mental 
health inpatient stays is not available in a usable format for the second post period.
D Employment measure is based on “present work status.” 
E  Health insurance 
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Appendix Table 3: Public Program Participation and Health Insurance, Logit Models 
  SSI  Welfare  Medicaid  Private Insurance  Any HI 
  Broad  Narrow Broad Narrow  Broad  Narrow Broad Narrow Broad  Narrow 
Pr(SSI) (1994-1996)  19.17***  18.38***  4.48***  4.53***  10.39***  10.20*** -9.95*** -9.44*** -2.74***  -2.34 
  (1.04) (1.22)  (0.78) (0.87)  (0.66)  (0.70) (0.70) (0.74) (0.55)  (0.62) 
After  1996  0.73**  0.77*  -0.38***  -0.47***  -0.50***  -0.55*** 0.43*** 0.31*** 0.29***  0.18 
  (0.34) (0.47)  (0.14) (0.18)  (0.15)  (0.18) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09)  (0.11) 
After 1998  0.56***  0.59**  0.25  0.16  0.21  0.20  -0.06  -0.04  0.02  0.08 
  (0.21) (0.30)  (0.18) (0.24)  (0.14)  (0.18) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08)  (0.09) 
Pr(SSI)*After 1996  -0.53  -0.29  -1.38  -1.27  2.61**  3.22**  -0.20  0.32  1.03  1.71 
  (1.61) (2.19)  (1.30) (1.52)  (1.22)  (1.41) (1.14) (1.25) (0.99)  (1.07) 
Pr(SSI)*After1998 -2.93**  -2.79  2.47**  2.13  -1.75  -3.05**  1.07  0.56  -0.60  -1.80* 
  (1.46) (1.89)  (1.20) (1.41)  (1.23)  (1.45) (1.06) (1.15) (0.90)  (0.95) 
Broad Substance Abuser Group  0.16    -0.14    -0.35***    -0.02    -0.17***   
 (0.32)    (0.11)    (0.11)    (0.07)    (0.06)   
Narrow Substance Abuser Group  0.41    -0.02    -0.24**    -0.07    -0.21*** 
   (0.45)    (0.14)    (0.12)    (0.08)    (0.08) 
Broad Group*After 1996  -0.71    0.35*    0.36**    -0.21**    -0.06   
 (0.47)    (0.20)    (0.16)    (0.10)    (0.11)   
Narrow Group*After 1996  -0.74    0.41    0.42**    -0.15    0.05 
   (0.71)    (0.26)    (0.20)    (0.15)    (0.14) 
Broad Group*After 1998  0.74**    -0.05    0.05    0.03    0.00   
 (0.33)    (0.19)    (0.14)    (0.09)    (0.10)   
Narrow Group*After1998  0.84    -0.02    0.11    -0.05    -0.07 
   (0.54)    (0.24)    (0.19)    (0.13)    (0.12) 
Pr(SSI)*Broad Group  0.80    2.94*    4.11***    -2.30    0.05   
 (2.45)    (1.59)    (1.49)    (1.60)    (1.11)   
Pr(SSI)*Narrow Group    1.46    1.74    3.56**    -2.37    0.62 
   (3.19)    (1.77)    (1.80)    (2.26)    (1.35) 
Pr(SSI)*Broad Group*After 1996  -0.48    -0.50    -4.48*    2.92    -0.57   
 (3.41)    (2.52)    (2.33)    (2.39)    (1.89)   
Pr(SSI)*Narrow Group*After1996  -1.05    -0.23    -5.13*    0.46    -2.65 
   (5.12)    (3.09)    (2.84)    (3.01)    (2.37) 
Pr(SSI)*Broad Group*After 1998  -1.20    -4.53**    0.82    -0.83    0.47     42
 (2.65)    (2.35)    (1.99)    (2.12)    (1.70)   
Pr(SSI)*Narrow Group*After 1998  -2.60    -6.12*    1.82    1.59    3.02 
   (4.00)    (3.35)    (2.69)    (2.48)    (2.11) 
                 































































NOTES:  Based on logit models using propensity score-weighted data to match characteristics in the pre-period. Robust, Huber-White corrected SEs shown in ( ) correct for 
correlation within sampling units.  *=p-value<=.10, **<=.05, ***<=.01.  Logit models also include controls for race-gender specific national unemployment rate, national 
arrest rate per 100,000 and national incarceration rate per 100,000 (coefficients not shown). Analyses are based on a sample size of 156,041.  
B Because the coefficients in 
the model are on a nonlinear scale, for ease of interpretation, we present the calculation of the triple differences in predicted probabilities obtained based on coefficients 
from the logit models above: DDD = {(Post-Treatment rate– Pre-Treatment rate) – (Post-Control rate– Pre-Control rate)}Pr(SSI)=.15.  - {(Post-Treatment rate– Pre-Treatment 
rate) – (Post-Control rate– Pre-Control rate)}Pr(SSI)=.05. We chose .15 and .05 as cutoff points for calculating DDD estimates since these span values of the Pr(SSI) that we 
observe in our data.  Standard errors on DDD estimates are bootstrapped using 100 replications.  43
 
Appendix Table 4:  Labor Market Outcomes, Logit Models 
 Employed  Full-time  Part-time  Disabled  In Labor Force 
  Broad Narrow  Broad Narrow  Broad Narrow  Broad Narrow  Broad  Narrow 
Pr(SSI) (1994-1996)  -8.54***  -8.08***  -6.76***  -5.96***  -3.41*** -3.91***  19.82*** 18.79*** -8.89*** -8.40*** 
  (0.65)  (0.71)  (0.69) (0.74)  (0.92) (0.94) (0.93)  (1.01) (0.68) (0.75) 
After  1996  0.17* 0.25* 0.14 0.22*  -0.04  -0.03 0.22  0.24 0.11 0.14 
  (0.10)  (0.13)  (0.09) (0.12)  (0.12) (0.12) (0.32)  (0.37) (0.12) (0.16) 
After  1998  0.16* 0.14  0.03 0.02 -0.21**  -0.16 0.45*  0.50 0.10 0.01 
  (0.09)  (0.11)  (0.08) (0.11)  (0.10) (0.14) (0.27)  (0.33) (0.09) (0.12) 
Pr(SSI)*After 1996  -2.27**  -2.28*  -1.65*  -1.48  -1.07  -2.02  3.02*  3.53*  -2.26**  -2.75** 
  (0.93)  (1.21)  (0.99) (1.20)  (1.72) (1.61) (1.69)  (2.06) (0.98) (1.25) 
Pr(SSI)*After1998  1.69**  2.57**  2.43***  2.72***  -1.28 1.18  -2.63*  -2.74 1.57*  2.48** 
  (0.85)  (1.07)  (0.88) (1.06)  (1.57) (1.55) (1.52)  (1.85) (0.91) (1.14) 
Broad Substance Abuser Group  0.21***    0.07    0.23***    -0.53***    0.35***   
 (0.08)    (0.06)    (0.09)    (0.19)    (0.09)   
Narrow Substance Abuser Group  0.05    -0.05    0.25**    -0.31    0.13 
   (0.12)    (0.09)    (0.12)    (0.25)    (0.14) 
Broad Group*After 1996  -0.36***    -0.21**    -0.18    -0.40    -0.42***   
 (0.13)    (0.11)    (0.12)    (0.39)    (0.15)   
Narrow Group*After 1996  -0.42***    -0.26*    -0.22    -1.13**    -0.54*** 
   (0.17)    (0.15)    (0.19)    (0.52)    (0.20) 
Broad Group*After 1998  -0.07    -0.10    0.07    0.98***    -0.07   
 (0.11)    (0.10)    (0.10)    (0.37)    (0.12)   
Narrow Group*After1998  0.09    0.08    0.01    2.04***    0.20 
   (0.14)    (0.13)    (0.16)    (0.51)    (0.16) 
Pr(SSI)*Broad Group  -3.48***    -1.60    -4.21*    3.44*    -3.14**   
 (1.30)    (1.35)    (2.39)    (1.89)    (1.34)   
Pr(SSI)*Narrow Group    -3.45*    -1.54    -5.83**    2.78    -3.40* 
   (1.85)    (1.81)    (2.43)    (2.26)    (1.82) 
Pr(SSI)*Broad Group*After 1996  5.40***    3.68*    2.72    -0.37    5.99***   
 (1.94)    (2.03)    (3.24)    (2.88)    (1.99)   
Pr(SSI)*Narrow Group*After1996  5.53**    3.38    5.18    3.52    8.44*** 
   (2.74)    (2.70)    (3.76)    (3.89)    (2.71) 
Pr(SSI)*Broad Group*After 1998  -0.57    -1.25    2.75    -4.62*    -1.23     44
 (1.71)    (1.73)    (2.82)    (2.81)    (1.77)   
Pr(SSI)*Narrow Group*After 1998  -2.79    -3.19    1.31    -9.62    -5.02** 
   (2.15)    (2.12)    (3.62)    (3.75)    (2.23) 
                    
































































NOTES:  Based on logit models using propensity score-weighted data to match characteristics in the pre-period. Robust, Huber-White corrected SEs shown in ( ) 
correct for correlation within sampling units.  *=p-value<=.10, **<=.05, ***<=.01.  Logit models also include controls for race-gender specific national 
unemployment rate, national arrest rate per 100,000 and national incarceration rate per 100,000 (coefficients not shown). Analyses are based on a sample size of 
156,041.  
B Because the coefficients in the model are on a nonlinear scale, for ease of interpretation, we present the calculation of the triple differences in 
predicted probabilities obtained based on coefficients from the logit models above: DDD = {(Post-Treatment rate– Pre-Treatment rate) – (Post-Control rate– Pre-
Control rate)}Pr(SSI)=.15.  - {(Post-Treatment rate– Pre-Treatment rate) – (Post-Control rate– Pre-Control rate)}Pr(SSI)=.05. We chose .15 and .05 as cutoff points for 
calculating DDD estimates since these span values of the Pr(SSI) that we observe in our data.  Standard errors on DDD estimates are bootstrapped using 100 
replications.   45
 
Appendix Table 5: Health Care Utilization and Arrests in Last Year, Logit Models 
 ER  Visit  Hospital  Adminission  Psychiatric Visit  Psych. Admission  Arrested/booked 
               
Pr(SSI) (1994-1996)  5.42***  4.54***  7.55***  7.21***  8.00***  8.32***  11.57***  11.78***  2.14  1.95 
  (0.61) (0.71) (0.80) (0.88) (1.10)  (1.28) (1.88) (2.35)  (2.27) (1.95) 
After 1996  -0.28***  -0.21**  -0.01  0.07  -0.30*  -0.39*  -0.13  -0.03  -0.11  0.02 
  (0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.17) (0.18)  (0.21) (0.47) (0.54)  (0.28) (0.33) 
After  1998  0.24*** 0.21**  0.34*** 0.36**  -0.12  -0.08      1.41*** 1.14*** 
 (0.08)  (0.10)  (0.11)  (0.15)  (0.18)  (0.21)      (0.18)  (0.20) 
Pr(SSI)*After  1996  0.09  -0.62 0.37 1.15  2.15  1.93 2.62 5.25  0.69  -2.51 
  (0.98) (1.06) (1.17) (1.29) (1.55)  (1.80) (4.08) (3.83)  (3.08) (2.71) 
Pr(SSI)*After1998 -0.39  0.28  -0.62  -1.60  -2.62**  -3.42***      1.51  3.53* 
 (0.79)  (0.91)  (1.01)  (1.15)  (1.27)  (1.29)      (2.32)  (2.04) 
Broad Substance Abuser Group  0.15*    -0.20*    0.24*    0.69**    1.37***   
 (0.08)    (0.12)    (0.14)    (0.34)    (0.14)   
Narrow Substance Abuser Group  0.25***    -0.07    0.54***    1.28***    1.55*** 
   (0.09)    (0.15)    (0.15)    (0.38)    (0.16) 
Broad  Group*After  1996  0.02   0.13   0.35    -0.07   0.15  
 (0.13)    (0.17)    (0.24)    (0.55)    (0.21)   
Narrow Group*After 1996  -0.07    0.17    0.26    -0.04    -0.09 
   (0.15)    (0.21)    (0.28)    (0.55)    (0.21) 
Broad Group*After 1998  0.08    0.15    0.16        -0.39**   
 (0.10)    (0.16)    (0.21)        (0.18)   
Narrow Group*After1998  0.08    0.37**    0.28        -0.36* 
   (0.13)    (0.18)    (0.24)        (0.19) 
Pr(SSI)*Broad Group  -1.70    1.23    1.44    1.37    -0.48   
 (1.28)    (1.76)    (1.70)    (3.66)    (2.69)   
Pr(SSI)*Narrow Group    -1.43    2.07    0.77    -0.74    -3.03 
   (1.55)    (2.20)    (2.09)    (4.56)    (2.40) 
Pr(SSI)*Broad Group*After 1996  1.56    0.47    -3.64    3.19    -0.12   
 (2.11)    (2.18)    (2.77)    (5.87)    (3.68)   
Pr(SSI)*Narrow Group*After1996  2.59    -1.25    -3.49    -0.36    4.98 
   (2.61)    (3.06)    (3.04)    (6.20)    (3.46) 
Pr(SSI)*Broad  Group*After  1998  -0.67   0.33   1.35        0.84    46
 (1.92)    (2.02)    (2.32)        (2.96)   
Pr(SSI)*Narrow Group*After 1998  -0.87    0.59    1.69        -1.75 
   (2.20)    (2.42)    (2.51)        (3.10) 
                























































NOTES:  Based on logit models using propensity score-weighted data to match characteristics in the pre-period. Robust, Huber-White corrected SEs shown in ( ) 
correct for correlation within sampling units.  *=p-value<=.10, **<=.05, ***<=.01.  Logit models also include controls for race-gender specific national 
unemployment rate, national arrest rate per 100,000 and national incarceration rate per 100,000 (coefficients not shown). Analyses are based on a sample size of 
156,041.  
B Because the coefficients in the model are on a nonlinear scale, for ease of interpretation, we present the calculation of the triple differences in 
predicted probabilities obtained based on coefficients from the logit models above: DDD = {(Post-Treatment rate– Pre-Treatment rate) – (Post-Control rate– Pre-
Control rate)}Pr(SSI)=.15.  - {(Post-Treatment rate– Pre-Treatment rate) – (Post-Control rate– Pre-Control rate)}Pr(SSI)=.05. We chose .15 and .05 as cutoff points for 
calculating DDD estimates since these span values of the Pr(SSI) that we observe in our data.  Standard errors on DDD estimates are bootstrapped using 100 
replications. 